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Bob Kerrey GMOH# 110 
(Interviewer: Brien Williams) June 11, 2009 
 
 
Brien Williams:  This is an oral history interview with former Senator and current 
President of the New School University in New York City, Bob Kerrey, for the George J. 
Mitchell Oral History Project at Bowdoin College.  We are in the president’s office at the New 
School in New York City, and today is Thursday, June 11, 2009, and I am Brien Williams.  I 
thought where we would start is with your coming into the Senate in 1989, and was there 
anything in common about you as a class of ‘88 who came in, the group of you? 
 
Bob Kerrey:     Well, there were only four of us, it was a small class.  It was Chuck Robb, 
myself, Dick Bryan, and Joe Lieberman; we all came in in the same group.  And actually I first 
met George Mitchell, Senator Mitchell in 19-, I think it was ‘86, when I came back to 
Washington, maybe it was ‘85, whenever it was that he was chairman of the Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee, because he tried to persuade me to run for Senate.  And then I 
met him -   The first thing that happens after you’re elected, you come back before actually 
you’re sworn in, and you caucus and you select your leadership.  So I supported Senator Mitchell 
for majority leader, that’s how I really first got to know him was when he was making an appeal 
for me to vote for him rather than Bennett Johnston or Danny Inouye.  Both of them I liked a lot 
as well. 
 
BW:  So am I to believe that George Mitchell’s putting the pressure on you was, caused you to 
have a Senate career, or? 
 
BK:  No, but, no, actually I told him ‘no’ when he asked me to run for Senate, I was finishing 
up my first term as governor and I did not run for a second term, I was anxious to go back to a 
private life.  And so no, he didn’t persuade me to run for Senate, I persuaded, in part, mostly 
persuaded myself a couple years later. 
 
BW:  But he was putting the seat in your mind, although I guess it was already there. 
 
BK:  Well, he wasn’t really.  No, actually the seed that was put in my mind came a bit later, 
about the Senate.  I didn’t really have any intent.  [Cough] Hope that doesn’t mess up your 
recording. 
 
BW: Oh that’s all right.  Just – 
 
BK: I didn’t have any intent – 
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BW: Just my ear. 
 
BK: Just your ear. 
 
BW: No, I’m joking. 
 
BK: But Senator Mitchell had a big impact on my Senate career because of the two 
committees that I was most anxious to be on – Appropriations and Intelligence – he assigned me 
to both. 
 
BW:  Really, really.  Right from the start? 
 
BK:  Right from the start. 
 
BW:  Now when you came in he was just beginning as majority leader, as you’ve just said. 
 
BK:  He was elected as majority leader by the Democratic Caucus in, I think it was November 
of 1988. 
 
BW:  And took over the office in ‘89, in the session. 
 
BK:  That’s correct. 
 
BW:  Did you see him grow in that role a lot, or did he come in just full speed ahead as 
majority leader, do you have any sense of that? 
 
BK:  Well I didn’t have the opportunity to serve with him prior to him being majority leader, 
so I can’t position him against what he used to be like.  But right from the beginning I saw 
tremendous, I wouldn’t actually say oratorical skills so much as his logical skills in presenting 
his argument.  He was a real leader from day one, both on the floor of the Senate as well as 
inside the caucus. 
 
BW:  How would you characterize his style as leader, what would be the words you’d use to 
describe his leadership style? 
 
BK:  Well, George was an unusual combination of gentleness, very considerate, very 
respectful, and at the same time when he’s engaged in an effort, such as we’ll say the Clean Air 
Act of 1990, he’s quite determined, knows what he wants and has got a pretty good idea of what 
he needs to do in order to get there. 
 
BW:  What would you say were his strong points as majority leader, what would be the things 
that, like was he a great strategist, or very convivial, or -? 
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BK:  Well I think his strength is, he’s a leader, he’s a natural leader, and he uses his natural 
skills very, very well.  He manages in the caucus to make you feel like you’re still an 
independent member of the caucus, but produced, on most occasions, very large votes from the 
majority for a variety of initiatives; Clean Air is actually quite a good example because you have 
a range of interests in the Democratic Caucus, and east to west, that make it difficult to put 
together a piece of legislation that everybody can support.  He did the same thing working with 
the first President Bush on the budget, the 1990 budget which set in the motion balancing the 
budget seven years later.  So there he had to work with a president of the other party, and pull the 
Democratic Caucus, at least in the Senate, and influence the House as well and getting us set on 
the road to balancing the budget. 
 
BW:  Were you part of the retreat to Andrews Air Force Base for that? 
 
BK:  No, no, I was too young for that voyage. 
 
BW:  You heard about it, I guess, from your - 
 
BK:  Well, I was asked to vote on it, so yes, and it kind of answers your other question, I 
wasn’t invited to the meeting – I wasn’t selected because I wasn’t on the Budget Committee, to 
go – but George did a very good job of communicating to everybody what was going on, was 
very clear in explaining what’s in the bill, and, I think, increased the chances therefore that 
Democrats signed on with President Bush.  President Bush got a lot of criticism for supporting a 
tax increase but deserved a tremendous amount of praise actually, bringing Democrats, just to 
use the political spectrum more towards the center in some cases, center-right, with PAYGO and 
other procedures that you would normally think of as coming from conservative Republicans.  
So George did a very good job of keeping not just the caucus together, but the Senate together at 
that moment.  He’s a natural leader, and he uses the natural skills that he has exceptionally well. 
 
BW:  How important is the majority leader, or ‘the leader’ of either party? 
 
BK:  Well, it’s very important, because the only thing that separates the Senate from having 
no order at all are, first of all, the Rules of the Senate, but secondly, the leader.  And, “I wasn’t 
elected as a Democrat,” Senator Mitchell is very fond of saying, “I’m a United States senator 
first, I’m a Maine senator second, and I’m a Democratic senator third.”  Well that describes all of 
the other ninety-nine people in the Senate better than they’re apt to be able to describe 
themselves.  So you’re thinking is, you orient to your state and your country before you orient to 
the caucus, so trying to pull that caucus together in some ways that preserves the independence 
of an individual is a real difficult task, and that George did it is a mark of a real leader. 
 
BW:  We’ve seen in recent years with the Republican Party pretty much everyone walking in 
lock-step with the leadership.  The Democratic Party doesn’t operate that way, correct? 
 
BK:  Well – who was it? – Will Rogers, who said, “I’m not a member of any organized party, 
I’m a Democrat,” so yes, it’s kind of in the gene code of individuals who orient to the 
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Democratic Party, it can be baffling and it can be maddening for people to watch us go in many, 
many different directions, but that’s who we are. 
 
BW:  Coming in with the experience as a governor, what did you have to learn, or what were 
the striking differences about being a senator? 
 
BK:  Well, many differences.  I wasn’t just a governor, I was a non-lawyer, so I had to learn a 
lot about laws and how to write laws, and the relationship between the law and the Constitution.  
In my case, I spent a fair amount [of time] over at the Supreme Court listening to oral arguments 
as a means of getting that job done.  But the actions and work and effort required to be successful 
in the legislative branch of a government are considerably different than what’s necessarily to be 
successful in the executive branch.  There are certain things, certain commonalities, but there’s a 
lot of differences. 
 
BW:  What are some of the important lessons that you learned that you needed to learn to be a 
successful senator? 
 
BK:  Well, you have to learn the language of the law – the laws are different, and you had to 
learn the rules.  There are certain rules of governing as a governor, but it’s not like a legislative 
body where all of a sudden something comparable to Robert’s Rules of Order are necessary.  
You had to learn what a markup was, and you had to learn what a conference committee was, 
and you had to learn the schedule and you had to learn the rules of debate and so forth, and it’s a 
different set of work than you’ve got on the executive branch. 
 
BW:  When did you end up feeling comfortable as a senator?  Right away, or did it take a long, 
take a little while? 
 
BK:  No, I’d spent time in Washington as governor, but that was a big city for me, so -  I don’t 
want to make it sound like I was a complete rube, but it was a lot bigger place than I’d ever been 
in before, and walking into the United States Congress is like walking into a church.  So I had 
this reverence for the place as a consequence of the history, and its importance under the 
Constitution, and then just a lot of things that I had to learn in order to -  So I don’t know when it 
was that I got completely comfortable.  I had confidence, but in terms of saying, “Okay, I’m 
ready to do the job,” I don’t know, I think I got better every day that I was there, so I was more 
comfortable the second day than I was the first, and more, you know, I just kept, even though I, 
you’d have setbacks, you’d have moments where you’d think, “Gee, how could I have been that 
stupid to have done that?” 
 
BW:  Did you attach yourself to some colleagues, sort of as, let them be your mentor, or did 
someone, say, reach out a hand? 
 
BK:  Well, George is a real role model, he would be one, just to continue that, but the answer 
is yes, personal relationships matter in the Congress, a lot more than people realize.  In some 
ways more than ideology.  So I’d hang out with guys that were in wars, World War II, I got close 
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to Warren Rudman, who was in the Korean War, got close to Mark Hatfield who was in the 
Second World War.  So there’s a tendency to orient to individuals who have similar sets of 
experiences.  Pat Moynihan probably became my best friend in all of the Senate.  It wasn’t 
because I have an intellectual capacity that rivals his, it’s because he was in the navy, and loved 
the navy, he considered it to be one of the most important experiences of his life.  So I think 
that’s where he and I, in first instance, bonded. 
 
George, when I think of Senator Mitchell I think of listening to the way he would present his 
case.  He’d take his time, and you had to be very, very prepared when you were debating with 
Senator Mitchell, because he would listen closely to what you were saying, leaning in, and it 
wasn’t like you felt like you were going to become his prey in a physical way, but intellectually 
he certainly could if you – he would say, “Now yesterday you said something entirely different, 
Senator Kerrey.”  I mean, can I explain?  And you’d, “Oh my gosh, the lair has been set and the 
hook is sunk,” or whatever.  So you could learn a lot, and do far worse, listening to Senator 
Mitchell under all occasions.  At a press conference, I was in his presence when he was making 
the presentation to the press, and he would be slow and deliberate and fully prepared for 
whatever it was that he was going to say. 
 
BW:  I wondered about his TV presence.  That has become such an important part, I guess, of 
being a leader.  And his studiousness and being called ‘the Judge’ and so forth, would not 
necessarily play into being a good TV personality, but I guess from your perspective, he was 
very effective in that role. 
 
BK:  He was very effective in that role, although if you’re great on television and you do a 
lousy job of managing the caucus, managing the caucus is the first order of business for a 
majority leader.  If you can’t manage the caucus, you’re not going to be majority leader for very 
long, because inside of that caucus on a weekly basis, if disorder prevails, when the Senate 
organizes itself, which it does every two years, you’re not going to get the votes to retain the 
authority of the majority leader.  So you have to be able to manage that aucus in the first 
instance. 
 
It helps if you can carry the debate on the floor, and George certainly could.  And that becomes, I 
would say, the second most important thing, being able to lead the floor debate, whatever the 
Democratic position happened to be versus the Republican position.  Though there are times 
when the lines would be blurred, most often it was a Republican leader on the right and a 
Democratic leader on the left, and George sat on the left and Bob Dole in my era was on the right 
– and Bob Dole’s no slouch himself, he can hit the ball pretty far himself when it comes to a 
debate. 
 
And then thirdly, but less important, is the way you present yourself to the nation.  You could 
present yourself very poorly to the nation, and be very good in the first two and the caucus will 
pick you every single time, because we need a leader, and we need somebody who can lead us 
both in the caucus and on the floor. 
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BW:  You mentioned a moment ago debating Senator Mitchell.  What were some of the issues 
that brought you two into a debating stance? 
 
BK:  Well, let me think.  Fortunately I was on his side most of the time, so we were debating 
together.  Well, I don’t know, we may have to come back to that.  I can’t honestly say that he and 
I were ever in a ferocious, contentious debate on the floor.  But I certainly watched others.  Most 
particularly I would watch he and Bob Dole, because they were called upon quite frequently to 
debate each other, the Republican and the Democratic leader. 
 
BW:  How would you describe Dole’s persona as compared to George Mitchell? 
 
BK:  Well Bob Dole had this stature.  George acquired it, but Dole had it from the Second 
World War, and you knew enough about his story to say, “This guy’s covered a lot of distance.”  
So you looked at somebody with his story and said, “This is a member of the greatest generation, 
this is a guy who was injured and almost died in Italy, and he requires stature.”  And he was 
more experienced; he had been in the House, he had been in the Senate, ran for vice president, he 
was chairman of the Republican Party.  And Dole was more of a passionate debater, he’d bring 
passion, both humor and sometimes real ferocity to a debate. 
 
But Bob Dole and George Mitchell were alike in one key way, which was, they came back to 
George’s definition, “I’m a United States senator first,” and so they would find common ground.  
And prior to Senator Mitchell becoming the majority leader, Bob Dole was a part of the effort to 
reform Social Security in 1983, I mean they were doing, I hate to sound like an old fart, but they 
used to do things, Dole and Mitchell, that are very difficult today for the Democrat and the 
Republican leader to do, as a consequence of the way things have become more polarized. 
 
BW:  Did the war commonality, the war experience that you talked about for bonding people, 
did it also have an effect on you guys as legislators?  Did you look at things maybe a little bit 
differently if you’d had military experience, and particularly combat? 
 
BK:  I think so.  Yes, I would say yes, particularly those of us who were injured.  I mean Bob 
Dole was one of the leaders of the effort to change the law to provide civil rights protection for 
the disabled, in the Americans Disability Act, and pressure that.  He was, that was a major 
intervention in the market place, at odds with his political ideology, his economic ideology.  But 
I think his own experience caused him to reach the conclusion that it was necessary.  And you 
could hear in the tone of the voices of Bob Dole and Mark Hatfield and Warren Rudman, Danny 
Inouye, these guys that had experienced the ferocity of war.  They didn’t get up and talk about it 
in patriotic terms alone, they were well aware of the horror of it. 
 
So yes, I would say that there was a different seriousness, a different approach that came.  But 
it’s like anybody that’s had a set of experiences of some kind, if there’s a debate relevant to war, 
relevant to taking care of veterans, we might bring something that other people wouldn’t.  But 
Chuck Grassley’s a hog farmer, so if a debate was about agricultural policy, he and Dick Lugar 
tended to get more credibility because they’d had that experience of farming. 
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BW:  Just a couple of other questions about George Mitchell as leader.  Did he ever take steps 
to, quote/unquote, ‘rein you in’ on a particular issue or anything, was there that kind of -? 
 
BK:  I think you’d have to ask him.  I never felt reined in by Senator Mitchell.  My guess is 
the answer is yes, certainly he had, I tended to be more of an independent Democrat, he’d 
probably tell you plenty of stories where he thought, “God, who’s going to talk to Kerrey to get 
him to go with us?” on the ‘93 budget and other sorts of things.  I was largely a team player 
when it came to Democratic ideas in which I believed, so I would guess that – and in fact it’s 
quite revealing that, about his brand of leadership, that I can’t recall an instance where he’d rein 
me in, even though my guess is he did. 
 
BW:  Now, somewhere I read that your, you feel that your achievements, particularly in the 




BW: How crucial was Mitchell to furthering your ambitions in those areas? 
 
BK:  It was crucial.  I came to Senator Mitchell and asked to be on the Appropriations 
Committee in my first term, in my first year, and he agreed.  Now, Bob Byrd, the chairman of the 
committee, also agreed, so I’m not sure if he’d opposed it if Senator Mitchell could have gotten 
it done, but it was enormously important.  Because I like, among the things what I like to do is 
build things, and work with local communities on the Appropriations Committee, you can do 
that.  So I couldn’t have accomplished anywhere near what I was able to accomplish had he not 
done that. 
 
And as a result of my experience in the military, I had an interest in intelligence, and he gave me 
the position that would have made me chairman, had we not lost the majority in the November 
1994 election.  But as it was, I was vice chairman and was able to do a lot of the things that I 
cared deeply about as a consequence of that.  I wasn’t on the Finance Committee when Senator 
Mitchell was in the Senate, but I had a deep interest both in welfare, but particularly health care, 
so as a result again of my own experience in business, but probably more importantly my own 
experience as a patient.  He didn’t join with me when I introduced my bill in 1991, but he was 
very respectful and I would say sufficiently supportive that I certainly felt like I was getting a 
helping hand from him. 
 
BW:  And which bill was that? 
 
BK:  It was a bill called Health U.S.A., and in the end only Senator Moynihan and I co-
sponsored it, and largely because I ran for president, and if I had not run for president I think I 
might have been able to move that thing a bit further.  It was a kind of a modified single-payer 
system that established eligibility based upon proving that you are an American citizen or legal 
resident and nothing else.  So I think it contributed to health being a big part of the presidential 
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campaign in 1992.  And of course George had a big interest in it, such an interest in it that he 
turned down an opportunity to be on the Supreme Court to stay in ‘94 to try to help Bill Clinton 
get it passed. 
 
BW:  Were you, did I understand this right, you were on Appropriations and then moved to 
Finance, is that correct? 
 
BK:  That’s correct, after Senator Mitchell left I became a member of the Finance Committee 
when Tom Daschle was the majority leader. 
 
BW:  And that was a move that you requested, you wanted that? 
 
BK:  Yes, it was. 
 
BW:  For the reasons you - 
 
BK:  For the reason, right, because of an interest both in, well in all, in the four big areas, 
welfare, tax, health, and trade. 
 
BW:  Right, right.  And then I suppose Agriculture was pretty important for you politically, 
coming from Nebraska. 
 
BK:  It was, and I acquired an understanding of agriculture.  I mean I was, my mother was 
raised on a farm, but I grew up in Lincoln, Nebraska.  Indeed my, the incumbent governor 
against whom I ran in 1982 said, pretty close to factually, that I couldn’t tell an ear of corn from 
a ukulele, so -   I learned a lot about agriculture as a result of being governor, and the connection 
between agriculture and jobs and the environment and so forth, so yes, it was important for me 
politically, but I had a real interest in what the committee was doing, and its jurisdictions. 
 
BW:  Did you have problems, as fiscally conservative as you were, with some of the farm 
policy, particularly subsidies and things of that sort?  Or was that always easy for you? 
 
BK:  Well no, I did have a problem with it.  For fiscal, sometimes ideological reasons, I 
always felt that there was a better way than spending a lot of money to try to get prices higher.  
So yes, I would say I had some fiscal as well as policy qualms about farm programs. 
 
BW:  But you, as a result, you didn’t get a lot of opposition from state farmers? 
 
BK:  No, but the farmers themselves in Nebraska have very mixed feelings when it comes to 
getting a check from the government, they’d prefer to get it from the marketplace, and I think 
there is a way to get that done, but we were typically on the losing side of the argument.  So I 
think for the most part, farmers would not like to get a check from the government. 
 
BW:  Hmm-hmm.  You participated in a few what look like really big battles, and I guess one, 
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I’d like you to talk about your own position on the Gulf War, because you took a position and 
then later pretty much disclaimed it, I guess. 
 
BK:  Well I didn’t disclaim it, what I said was that the effort that we had, which was to try to 
delay the initiation of the war for the purpose of having some additional negotiation, I think we 
could have better accomplished the objectives that we had by saying to the Republicans, “We’ll 
support you if you’ll change the resolution itself.”  I think that was the mistake.  It’s an easy 
mistake to see looking back upon it, but I wouldn’t say that I repudiated the actual vote.  And I 
do think that what we were trying to do was right, but we would have been better off, I think we 
would have been better of saying, “Look, we’ll support this resolution if the following changes 
are made in it.”  That’s where I was with it. 
 
BW:  And you were talking about the ’91 – 
 
BK:  The ‘91 War Powers Resolution.  And I still can hear a lot of that debate, and I felt very 
uncomfortable that we appeared to be fighting a war just to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.  It wasn’t 
about freedom, it felt more about oil, it felt more connected to something that I didn’t feel like 
was worth what at that time was the predicted loss of life.  Predictions of much greater loss of 
life than what we ended up experiencing, and a much longer war than what we ended up 
experiencing as well.  And having fought in a war where public opinion turned in a hurry, my 
view was that if there wasn’t a larger purpose than just driving Iraq out of Kuwait, I was worried 
that we’d get involved in another war and then not be able to sustain public support for it, if it 
floundered and met unexpected setbacks. 
 
BW:  But when you had second thoughts about your vote, that was based on your feeling that 
we should have gone in and done away with Saddam, or not? 
 
BK:  Well, it’s more than doing away with Saddam; it’s a longer point of discussion.  I think 
we made a mistake then, and I think we made a mistake later on not supporting the efforts that 
were necessary to build democracy inside of Iraq.  There’s a large, both ex-pat as well as 
indigenous, Iraqi population that were organizing themselves, particularly after the first Gulf 
War, when we got a United Nations Security Council resolution demanding the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction, and then Saddam refused, at one point, kicked them out in ‘98.  So 
again, it’s a complicated answer but yes, I think that building a democratic alternative in Iraq was 
possible, and I don’t think we, either under President Clinton or President Bush, did the kinds of 
efforts necessary to do that preliminary work.  It takes time, and we didn’t do it. 
 
BW:  You mentioned the Clean Air Act.  That was something that George Mitchell really 
pushed hard on, as I understand it. 
 
BK:  Yes, I recall when I talked to Senator Mitchell about what he was going to do as majority 
leader as top of his list, I recall at the time acid rain was a big problem in the northeast, and that 
was a problem that we weren’t experiencing in Nebraska, clean air was hardly an issue in 
Nebraska at all.  So what Senator Mitchell fashioned was a really genius, as it turns out, 
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mechanism, the trading regiment for the right to pollute.  I think maybe some European nations 
had already done it, I don’t recall, but it was a bold way to solve an environmental problem and 
it worked, it worked. 
 
BW:  What was his position on the ‘90 budget, the one that I referred to, the Omnibus? 
 
BK:  Well, the OBRA, the Omnibus – what was it? – the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1990 was the foundation for the ‘93 and the ‘97.  All we did in ‘93 was amended the 1990 
Budget Act, and all we did in ‘97 was amended the ‘90 Budget Act, so the foundation for 
balancing the budget was built in 1990.  And it occurred when President Bush, maybe in private 
but he later publicly said he’s, “Had enough of voodoo economics, we’ve got to balance the 
budget,” and declared his willingness to support tax increases to get it done, or to put everything 
on the table, I think that was the language, and in the negotiations that followed, tax increases 
ended up being a part of the package, as well as spending cuts and spending restraints and all the 
other sorts of things that eventually balanced the budget.  So I don’t think we’d have gotten the 
agreement without Senator Mitchell, and I think a special relationship that he had with President 
Bush. 
 
BW:  That was going to be my next question, what kind of a relationship you felt he did have 
with - 
 
BK:  Well I felt that he had a very good relationship.  President Bush vacationed at 
Kennebunkport, and it seemed to me that that relationship was important.  I don’t know, maybe 
it’s just putting on rose-colored glasses to examine it, but I don’t think he could have gotten it 
done unless he had a good relationship with President Bush, and it had to be done in a fashion 
that the president would support, because if he vetoed it, we didn’t have the votes to override it. 
 
BW:  My next question would be then, what about his relations with Bill Clinton? 
 
BK:  Well again, I think they were largely good.  I recall in 1992, he organized a big event in 
New York and had all the senators who had run for president, and a bunch of other people as 
well, coming up to the Waldorf and doing a big unity event.  I think he had a very good 
relationship with Bill Clinton.  And it was at a difficult time, I mean ‘93 was exciting, and then 
health care fell apart, and we ended up losing the majority in 1994, so it was a tough time for 
Senator Mitchell, because he’d turned down a chance to be on the Supreme Court. 
 
BW:  What was your position on the stimulus bill that preceded the budget in ‘93? 
 
BK:  I voted against it. 
 
BW:  For what reasons? 
 
BK:  Well I think it was $50 billion; it looked like it was going to stimulate a few interest 
groups.  And the economy was recovering; I didn’t think we needed a stimulus, not at that 
  
Page 11 of  16 
particular time.  It’s not like today where if you didn’t stimulate the economy in some fashion, 
you fear that the economy’s going to spiral downward out of control.  Then, but then, the 
economy was growing again.  So I don’t know, what needed to be stimulated?  What I thought 
was necessary was to balance the budget. 
 
BW:  What was Mitchell’s position on that, do you recall? 
 
BK:  Oh, I believe he supported it.  Look, being the majority leader’s a -  Being a Democrat 
when the president’s a Democrat, or being a Republican when the president’s a Republican in 
some ways is harder, because any disagreement you’ve got with him is magnified beyond the 
significance.  People still feel like, they say, “Oh, you and Bill Clinton never got along.”  Well 
that’s not true, we got along just fine.  We had a couple high-profile disagreements, but it never 
caused me to lose respect for him and willingness to work with him.  But the majority leader, 
you don’t have that option.  You can’t say, “I’m not for the stimulus package.”  You’ve got to be 
for it, and you’ve got to try to deliver as many Democratic votes as possible. 
 
BW:  Do you want to give me your version of the battle with the budget in ‘93 and your 
holding out and so forth? 
 
BK:  Well, I won’t give you my version; I’ll tell you what happened. 
 
BW:  Okay, a deal. 
 
BK:  Well, the budget passed the Senate, and I had made a statement indicating where I 
thought the bill was weak.  And it went to conference and it came back from the House-Senate 
conference worse, in my view, than when it left the Senate, with fewer cuts and more taxes 
basically.  And I thought, “Look, we’re going to catch hell for voting for this thing, let’s get the 
job done. Why do two-thirds of it?  Let’s get it all done.”  And in particular I thought that 
additional spending cuts were warranted, so I’d basically, with my own language, had put myself 
in a position where I’d have to vote ‘no.’ 
 
And then I was sitting at my desk, watching C-Span, and I see, “Oh my God, there’s a 
Democratic press conference,” and it’s Dick Bryan, Sam Nunn, Bennett Johnson, David Boren, 
Frank Lautenberg, five of the six Democrats who had yet to declare how they’re going to vote, 
saying they’re going to vote ‘no.’  And I knew exactly what that meant – “I’m the last man.”  I 
don’t know why I wasn’t invited to the press conference.  Had I been invited to the press 
conference, it would have been all six of us there saying, “We’re going to vote no.”  So when it 
became clear that it was the best we were going to get, I had a conversation with Bob Dole and 
asked him where we’d go if I voted no, and I just wasn’t confident that we’d get any better than 
that, so I voted yes.  I made my decision, wrote a speech, and went and saw a movie. 
 
Mostly just to avoid the press, because they were just, the minute that – it felt like to me – minute 
after that press conference with those five people, everybody understood in the press what it 
meant:  “Let’s go see how Kerrey’s going to vote.”  Well they started camping outside my 
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doorstep, so it’s an object lesson:  I never again was the last person to make up their mind about 
a controversial issue. 
 
BW:  You took some pretty hot phone, at least one pretty hot phone call from the president, 
too. 
 
BK:  Oh, a lot of them, a lot of them, yes. 
 




BW:  What are the most vivid memories then, moving on to ‘94 and the health care battle, for 
you, in terms of that? 
 
BK:  Well, I was a part of the – I don’t know what we called ourselves – the mainstream, 
centrist coalition or something; it was led by John Chafee and John Breaux.  And, God, there was 
just one moment, and I remember calling President Clinton, I said, “You got to support this bill, 
we’re ninety-eight” – or something like that – “percent of the way there.”  It wasn’t perfect, it 
wasn’t what I wanted to do from the beginning, but I had read his bill, I had taken it border to 
border in Nebraska, and I had a tough time explaining it to people because it was way too 
complicated.  And my bill was considerably to the left of him, so it wasn’t an ideological 
opposition, but I thought we had to pretty, still do think we have to pretty dramatically change it 
to create a different kind of market than the one we’ve got today. 
 
It was the only thing we were going to get, and there was a moment, about a twenty-four-hour 
period when Bob Dole was on our bill, the one that Chafee, and then he started to look and see 
what was in the darn thing and went against it.  But there was a moment when, if President 
Clinton had said, “I’ll support that bill,” I think we could have passed it.  Because Senator Dole 
was supportive of the bill at the time, and it looked like, I think his health policy guys were 
saying, “Oh, it’s too conservative.”  Because President Clinton had given a speech, I think it was 
in the ‘94 State of the Union, when he said, held up a card, and, “I’m not going to sign anything 
that doesn’t cover everybody.”  But it just wasn’t to be.  There are a lot of moments that I 
remember, but that’s the one I remember the most vividly, because I knew exactly what was 
going to happen, that we just didn’t have the votes to pass something with just Democrats alone. 
 
BW:  How would you characterize George Mitchell’s leadership on that one bill? 
 
BK:  Well again, it’s a terrific example, that moment’s a terrific example of the difficulty of 
being the leader.  He has to, Senator Mitchell was supporting President Clinton’s plan and trying 
to bring Democrats on board, and I thought that he did the best that he possibly could under the 
circumstances, but it turned out to be a losing cause, sometimes those things are that way.  Just a, 
it didn’t line up.  The insurance companies were running ‘Harry and Louise’ ads and spent a lot 
of money against it.  But, I thought Senator Mitchell did the best that he could under a very, very 
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difficult set of circumstances. 
 
I think Senator Clinton has said since that the process that she had established to produce a piece 
of legislation was flawed, because it was just too secret, nobody knew what it was, and here’s the 
bill and you look at the bill and, “Well I don’t know what these…”  I couldn’t quite understand 
how it was all going to work.  So my guess is it was a very difficult time for George. 
 
BW:  Well, and he made his own version of the bill, didn’t he?  And you were vocal in not 
supporting that too. 
 
BK:  Right.  Try to forget that, in this, that part of the oral history.  I hope I wasn’t 
disrespectfully vocal.  I can’t remember what his bill had in it.  I hadn’t, until you said that, I had 
forgotten that I’d - 
 
BW:  Well he had a bill, and Dole and Packwood had one, and so forth.  It was, they were 
challenging times. 
 
BK:  Yes, because it’s easy in life – and it kind of goes back to the Iraq vote -   I mean one of 
the things I should have said at the time, particularly in oral history, that people that are 
uninitiated in this process need to understand is that, if you’ve got a thousand votes over a twelve 
year period, and there were more, there was a thousand votes each year, so say a thousand votes 
each year, I don’t know, maybe a hundred of those votes you’re fifty-five percent certain when 
you walk down and vote.  And let’s say the vote’s on Monday, Tuesday you might only be forty-
five percent certain.  There’s a lot of these votes where the certainty level never rises to a 
hundred percent, even though it sounds like we’re a hundred percent certain, they never rise to a 
hundred percent.  Some of them do.  I would say most of them don’t, and there’s a number, 
particularly when they get controversial like that, where you’re like, “Oh my God,” after the fact, 
“maybe I voted wrong.”  And it’s exceptionally difficult to say that, because it sounds like you’re 
being wishy-washy and flip-flopping and so forth. 
 
BW:  Were you surprised that George Mitchell chose to retire in ‘94? 
 
BK:  Yes, I was surprised.  I was somewhere between surprised and very disappointed.  I 
mean he was, that left a big hole in the place.  So when you’ve got a leader and the leader walks 
off the field, that was a difficult moment for us. 
 
BW:  Did you get on the phone and say, “Rethink this decision, George,” or -? 
 
BK:  No, no.  A decision like that, once it’s made you’re not going to, and I wasn’t close 
enough to Senator Mitchell that he would confide in me that he was thinking about doing it.  So 
no, I didn’t try to talk him out of it. 
 
BW:  One other question, we passed through this, but I haven’t asked you anything about your 
run for the presidency in ‘92. 
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BK:  I was hoping you wouldn’t. 
 
BW:  Well, I’ll just ask one question, okay? 
 
BK:  Okay. 
 
BW:  Did George Mitchell ever communicate any sense of where his thoughts were on who 
was going to be the nominee and whatnot? 
 
BK:  Well he, no, he stayed neutral, he said very nice things about both Senator Harkin and I, 
with whom he served, and he stayed appropriately neutral and appropriately inoffensive to all the 
candidates who were running. 
 
BW:  Is there such a thing as a George Mitchell legacy, after he left the Senate, was there a 
legacy that you felt continuing on in ‘95 and so forth? 
 
BK:  Well I would say, first the changes in the law that he brought to bear were significant in 
and of themselves, so he’s got a significant legacy of accomplishment.  I’d say secondly that it’s 
likely that there’s an awful lot of young people in Maine who were influenced, because I know 
that George prided himself on giving commencement addresses, and my guess is there are young 
people who were in those audiences who had their lives changed by his words and presence and 
deeds.  And thirdly, I do think that people, I know my own self, I say, “I wonder if George 
Mitchell would do it this way?”  “You’re behaving like George Mitchell,” is a compliment, is a 
high compliment.  So yes, I think he set a standard of behavior that carried over.  I don’t know 
how long it carried over, but long enough. 
 
BW:  Was there a big adjustment to be made when Tom Daschle took over as maj-, well 
minority leader? 
 
BK:  Yes.  First of all, adjusting, we went from fifty-seven to forty-seven Democrats.  That’s a 
big adjustment all by itself; we’re no longer setting the agenda.  And President Clinton’s running 
for reelection and his numbers weren’t very good either, and he made a decision, he didn’t really 
run against us, but his argument was, “You need a Democratic president to control a Republican 
Congress.”  So he wasn’t out there saying, “We need a Democratic Congress again.”  So it was a 
challenging time to be in the minority.  Yes, I would say it was quite an adjustment to make.  It’s 
a lot more fun to be in the majority than the minority. 
 
BW:  Jumping ahead then, what were -? 
 
BK:  And we had a number of people in ‘95, like Jim Exon being the one I remember the most 
because he was my senior senator, and probably the man who had the biggest influence on me, 
my political life, made the decision not to run for reelection, so it wasn’t just that we had only 
forty-seven, we had half a dozen senior Democratic senators who announced they weren’t going 
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to run. 
 
BW:  What motivated your own decision to retire? 
 
BK:  Well, I was about to get married, and the woman I was intending to marry wanted to 
have a baby.  And I’d raised two kids in politics, or participated in raising two kids in politics, 
and I didn’t want to do it again.  I wanted to spend more time, if we ended up having a baby, and 
we ended up having a baby, so I decided not to do it.  Particularly after a job offer came to run 
this place, three blocks away from where she lived.   The first president here was from Nebraska, 
and I did a little bit of due diligence, said, “Yes.” 
 
BW:  Was it hard walking away? 
 
BK:  Oh yes, it’s very difficult.  Because like any time you know that what you’re going to 
say will disappoint people.  I made a lot of people in Nebraska happy, too, so I just didn’t, that 
wasn’t part of my objective, to make my political opponents happy, but my staff, my supporters, 
it disappointed people.  You don’t like to disappoint people. 
 
BW:  I’ve been asking people, do you recall any George Mitchell stories?  And I know it’s 
hard to say, I mean I, what I mean is some incident, some exchange.  I don’t know whether you 
did much travel with him at all? 
 
BK:  I didn’t do much travel with George.  I remember that terrible “Chauncey le pew” 
(sounds like) story that he told a hundred times, if he told it once. 
 
BW:  I may not have heard that. 
 
BK:  Well, I may not remember it.  In fact, I don’t remember it.  “Chauncey le pew was full of 
gas,” or something, I don’t remember exactly what it was, but I just remember George telling it 
over and over and over.  No, I don’t really have, say, a private George Mitchell story.  I probably 
should, I just don’t, can’t at the moment think of anything.  I think most of my encounters with 
George were in the Senate. 
 
BW:  How do you think he should be remembered? 
 
BK:  I think he should be remembered for his legislative accomplishments, first of all.  I 
would say he should be remembered for the way he conducted himself, which I think was 
exemplary.  And I think he should be remembered for the people whose lives he changed.  And 
this is beyond the Senate of course, he brought peace to Ireland, and hopefully will do the same 
in the Middle East, and he’s got a big legacy that comes as a consequence of intellect and 
attitude and values. 
 
BW:  Have you had much contact with him since you left the Senate? 
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BK:  I’ve had a little bit, because he’s in New York.  It’s a big city, and I’ve had less than I 
would have liked.  Every time I run into him, we say we ought to get together for dinner, and 
don’t manage to do it. 
 




BW: Are you a little bit envious of the folks that are down there in the Senate now, just 
because of everything that’s going on and the efforts that Obama is undertaking? 
 
BK:  No, I’m not.  I mean I had a moment when I had to decide; did I want to go back to 
Nebraska and run for the Senate?  I’m not saying I would have won in 2008, but 2007, when 
Chuck Hagel announced he wasn’t going to run, I made that decision.  And it was largely based 
upon knowing that you can’t go back.  So I’m happy that President Obama’s occupying 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue, and I’m happy that Congress is Democratic, and I’m happy for all of 
them, I wish them all the best.  But I don’t honestly envy them. 
 
BW:  Any last words, or shall we say this is it? 
 
BK:  No, that’s probably enough. 
 
BW:  Okay, very good.  Thank you very much. 
 
BK: You’re welcome. 
 
End of Interview 
 
